Antirivalness is orthogonal to nonrivalness
Editor: pontus-karlsson
Created: 2025-11-27T13:26
Updated: 2025-11-27T13:32
Implications
- Simply making something 'open' doesn't automatically create network effects
- System architecture determines whether sharing generates increasing returns
- Both dimensions must be addressed for full inclusiveness
Sources
Antirivalness is orthogonal to nonrivalness
Context
Many economists treat antirival goods as simply "more nonrival," but this misses a crucial distinction that [[f-xavier-olleros|F. Xavier Olleros]] identified in his [[olleros-antirival-goods-2018|2018 paper]]. Understanding these as separate dimensions rather than a continuum fundamentally changes how we approach designing commons and [[network-effects|network effects]] systems.
Analysis
[[f-xavier-olleros|Olleros]] argues that nonrival and antirival operate on orthogonal axes:
Nonrivalness is a property of the units being shared:
- Can the good be copied or shared without depletion?
- Does one person's consumption reduce availability for others?
- Example: An mp3 file is inherently nonrival - copying it doesn't diminish the original
Antirivalness is a property of the system enabling sharing:
- Does the sharing mechanism generate increasing returns?
- Does more usage create more value for all participants?
- Example: The Napster platform became more valuable as more people used it
This orthogonality means you can have four quadrants:
- Rival and non-antirival: Traditional physical goods
- Nonrival but non-antirival: A PDF sitting on a server
- Rival but antirival: Traffic light networks (rival physical objects, antirival coordination system)
- Nonrival AND antirival: Wikipedia, open source software with active communities
Supporting Evidence
From [[olleros-antirival-goods-2018|Olleros (2018)]]:
The traffic light example demonstrates antirivalness without full nonrivalness:
- The physical lights are rival (expensive to install in each city)
- The color code system is strongly antirival (more valuable as more cities adopt it)
- Installing traffic lights remains exclusive to cities that can afford them
- Yet the coordination benefit grows with network adoption
The mp3/Napster example shows nonrivalness requiring antirival systems for impact:
- Mp3 files alone were nonrival but didn't transform the music industry
- Only when embedded in Napster's antirival platform did they enable global music sharing
- The platform provided discovery, collective library building, and network effects
- Nonrivalness enabled low-cost sharing; antirivalness created compelling benefits
Notes
This distinction is foundational for co-goods theory. Physical products are inherently rival, but we can create antirival systems around them by:
- Opening up designs and knowledge (creating nonrival components)
- Building participation mechanisms (creating antirival dynamics)
- Designing feedback loops that increase value with usage
The key insight: we're not trying to make physical goods nonrival (impossible), but rather maximizing the nonrival/antirival ratio by designing systems where the non-physical components (knowledge, community, feedback) become the primary value drivers.